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“[W]e are still at the dawn of the Information Age, and much
more remains to be done to grasp its potential. We should use
1
technology to advance our oldest and deepest values . . . .”

I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s dot com world, many players are spending large
sums on acquiring electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) patents.
Most of these patents are a little bit software patent, a little bit
business method patent, and likely invalid. There is indeed growing
concern among commentators that the United States Patent Office
is issuing an ever-increasing number of invalid patents. Of course,
this statement is legally incorrect because a patent, once issued, is
2
presumed to be valid, which is one of the problems, indeed.
Reality demonstrates that many e-commerce patents are not
objectively valid and are emerging from prosecution enjoying the
same presumption of validity that all patents enjoy. In fact, many
business method and software patents that have been issued are
3
likely not valid, or have been demonstrated to be invalid.
For example, Priceline.com received a United States patent on

1. Press Release, William Jefferson Clinton, Release of the E-commerce
available
at
Working
Group’s
Final
Report
(Jan.
16,
2001),
http://clinton5.nara.gov/library/hot_releases/Jan._16_2001_2.html.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2001).
3. For discussion of some suspect patents, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are
Business Method Patents Bad For Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 263, 268 (2000) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,761,857 (issued June 9, 1998));
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (2000); John
R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 , 1161-62
(1999) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,668,736 (issued Sept. 16, 1997)); Seth Schulman,
Software Patents Tangle The Web, TECH. REV., Mar./Apr. 2000, at
http://www.techreview.com/articles/shulman0300.asp (explaining the Compton
patent on multimedia, which later had none of its forty-one claims emerge from
reexamination).
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pricing, selling and exercising options to purchase airline tickets.
This patent purports to give Priceline.com the exclusive right to
5
what is known as a Dutch auction, something that is hardly new or
unobvious. In fact, the ‘127 patent explains in its specification :
Until now, however, there has been no acceptable way to
minimize the risk of fluctuations in airline ticket prices. In
particular, as far as we are aware, options to purchase
airline tickets have never been sold. Moreover, no systems
have been developed for determining prices for options
on airline tickets, and keeping track of the sale and
6
exercise of those options.
Apparently, the fact that a Dutch auction has never been done
7
online makes this particular business method patentable.
Patentability, however, should not be such an easy question for this
and other business method patents. Business method patents such
as the Priceline.com patent are centered on a method of
conducting business, which is patentable—if at all—simply because
of its method of implementation.
Since the dawn of the Internet age, we have increasingly
become confronted with the nagging question presented by the
Priceline.com Dutch auction patent and countless others. When
should business method patents be granted to a method that
requires the use of Internet technology; or put another way, when
should e-commerce patents be granted? This question requires
careful consideration of both novelty and obviousness, and we must
reflect upon whether patent protection should extend to an old
business method that has new or revitalized relevance given the
speed of computers and the interconnectivity of those computers
through a global communications network. As evidenced by the

4. U.S. Patent No. 5,797,127 (issued Aug. 18, 1998) (“Method, apparatus,
and program for pricing, selling, and exercising options to purchase airline
tickets.”)
5. For an explanation of what a Dutch auction is, see the following helpful
websites:
Kate Reynolds, Auction Types—Dutch, AGORICS, INC., at
http://www.agorics.com/~agorics/auctions/auction3.html (1996); Dutch Auction,
EBAY, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/g-dutch-auction.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2002).
6. See supra note 4.
7. While it is true that long felt need in the industry is a consideration to be
taken into account when determining obviousness, see B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft
Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1 (1966), no amount of long felt need can override what is otherwise a
straightforward case of obviousness.
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Priceline.com Dutch auction patent, the method of doing business
is patentable simply because up until the dawn of the Internet age,
it was inconceivable that one could “minimize the risk of
fluctuations in airline ticket prices” in a manner that would allow
for meaningful commercial exploitation. Such an answer, however,
begs the essential question of whether the patentability
requirements have been sufficiently met. Given the state of the art
in technology leading up to the creation of the World Wide Web, it
would stretch the imagination to believe that a Dutch auction, as
carried out by Priceline.com, could withstand the rigors of an
unbiased and fully informed obviousness inquiry.
In all fairness to the United States Patent Office, they are
certainly not solely to blame for the explosion of e-commerce
patents. Likewise, it is also not to blame for the number of invalid
software and business method patents that are being issued. The
Patent Office is attempting to engage in more rigorous
8
examination of such patents, but even these laudable
improvements are falling short of the mark. One reason for this
problem is that the patent examining corps is simply too
overworked and does not have the proper resources to examine
patent applications in a manner likely to lead to the weeding out of
patents that ought not see the light of day. The real problem,
however, is best summarized by a 1999 survey conducted by Greg
Aharonian, which revealed that fifty percent of all patent
9
applications cited no prior art at all. Likewise, Mr. Aharonian
estimates that somewhere between fifty and seventy percent of
software patents would likely not issue if the examiners were to
conduct prior art searches of both Patent Office archives and
databases readily available but not accessible within the confines of
10
the Patent Office.
There is nothing inherently immoral or evil about software
patents, business method patents, or e-commerce patents. The
patent laws strike a delicate balance between innovation on the one
hand and exploitation and capitalism on the other. Without
providing the requisite level of economic incentive, we cannot

8. For the Revised Examination Guidelines for Computer Implemented
Inventions, see UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (8th ed. 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8_2100.pdf [hereinafter MPEP].
9. See Schulman, supra note 3.
10. Id.
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anticipate that inventors and entrepreneurs would be able to
engage in the full-time research and development required to
produce the level of innovation that we have become accustomed
to: the level of innovation deemed appropriate and necessary by
our founding fathers and those who preceded them. Nevertheless,
the delicate balance of the patent laws can be unnecessarily upset
and taken advantage of when the United States Patent &
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is issuing patents that it ought not
because they do not meet the patentability requirements of novelty
11
and non-obviousness. Given the cutbacks facing the USPTO, the
12
increased number of patent applications, and the lack of
significant prior art in the computer software and business method
13
fields, we may not be able to rely upon the USPTO to conduct the
rigorous examination that should occur prior to patent issuance.
A change is necessary to ensure that issued software, business
method and e-commerce patents properly enjoy the presumption
of validity. I have previously advocated for the enactment of a duty
14
to search prior art before filing at patent application. This duty,
however, is not the only solution. This paper will discuss whether
enforcement and licensing of these patents without first
conducting a prior art search should be considered patent misuse.
Toward that end, Part II of this article will explain how the Internet
works, including the obligatory examples of why the Internet and
the World Wide Web are better than sliced bread, baseball and
apple pie. Part III will then explain in a nutshell the fundamentals
of patent law. This explanation will be achieved by exploring the
patent grant, the role of the USPTO and the basic requirements for
patentability. Part IV will then detail the history of software patents,
11. Cliston Brown, Funding Remains Issue for U.S. Patent & Trademark Office: A
Push for Less Fee Withholding, CORP. L. TIMES, Jan. 2002, at 24.
12. See Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve
Patent Litigation: A Survey of Patent Litigators, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77, 106
(1999).
13. The primary prior art used in the examination process is prior United
States Patents. Unfortunately, however, the patenting of both software and
business methods is a relatively new phenomenon, as will be discussed infra. This
means that there are relatively few United States Patents available in these fields.
Moreover, with respect to business method patents, the bulk of the available
knowledge resides solely with the companies employing those methods. This leads
to the inescapable conclusion that there is very little prior art being used to
measure the validity of new software and business method patents, which will tend
to produce inferior results, or put another way, more invalid patents.
14. See Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., The Proliferation of E-commerce Patents: Don’t Blame
the PTO, RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. (2001) (forthcoming Mar. 2002).
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business method patents and the rise of what I call e-commerce
patents. Part V will then explore the law of patent misuse. Part VI
will explain why it may be appropriate to expand patent misuse and
breathe new life into that doctrine, particularly with respect to
e-commerce patents. Finally, Part VII will act as a brief conclusion.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNET
A. E-commerce Myths, Realities and Bedtime Stories
In April of 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce issued a
15
report, entitled The Emerging Digital Economy, which discussed the
virtues of the Internet, the World Wide Web and electronic
commerce in general. One of the more interesting portions of the
report was found in the conclusion, entitled Challenges Ahead, where
the Department of Commerce quite clearly and unambiguously
compared the “digital revolution” to the American Industrial
Revolution:
As with any major societal transformation, the digital
economy will foster change and some upheaval. The
Industrial Revolution brought great economic and social
benefit, but it also brought about massive dislocations of
people, increased industrial pollution, unhealthy child
labor and unsafe work environments. . . .
. . . . The good news is that the net economic growth
anticipated by this digital revolution will likely create
more jobs than those that are lost. Further, the jobs
created are likely to be higher-skilled and higher-paying
than those that will be displaced . . .
. . . . If . . . public policy issues can be resolved, and
electronic commerce is allowed to flourish, the digital
economy could accelerate world economic growth well
16
into the next century.
More recently, on January 15, 2000, the Department of
Commerce issued a report, entitled Leadership for the New
17
Millennium: Delivering on Digital Progress and Prosperity, which was
15. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY REPORT (Apr.
15, 1998), available at http://www.ecommerce.gov/viewhtml.htm.
Challenges
Ahead,
available
at
16. Id.
at
Chapter
Eight,
http://www.ecommerce.gov/danc8.htm.
17. U.S. WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (Jan. 16, 2001), available at
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the third and final report in the series. This latest government
report once again sings the praises of the Internet and the World
Wide Web, but also provides remarkable predictions for the near
term growth of e-commerce. The report puts the past and future
into perspective:
Perhaps the most visible symbol of the IT-related changes
over the last eight years is e-commerce. In 1993, when the
Clinton-Gore Administration took office there was no
appreciable business activity online. In December 1995,
when the White House Electronic Commerce Working
Group first convened, commerce on the Internet was just
beginning and its potential was not widely recognized.
Sales generated by the World Wide Web that year totaled
just over $435 million. Since then, business-to-consumer
and business-to-business e-commerce has skyrocketed.
Some estimates suggest that business-to-consumer ecommerce will total some $61 billion or more in 2000.
Some sources suggest that business-to-business ecommerce will exceed $184 billion in 2000. Although
estimates vary, there is strong consensus about continued
further growth. Business-to-consumer e-commerce could
swell to between $75 billion and $144 billion in 2003.
Business-to-business e-commerce could reach between
$634 billion and $3.9 trillion. Already approximately 3 in
5 companies are using e-commerce to some extent and a
further 20 percent say they intend to do so in the
future.By 2003 some 80 percent of all business-to-business
transactions could occur online.
It is understandable that today some may be skeptical about
comparing the digital economy with the American Industrial
Revolution. Numerous Internet companies are defunct, and
countless others are clinging to life. Excite@Home recently sold its
Blue Mountain Arts to American Greetings for $35 million in
18
cash, which may not seem paltry until you realize that
Excite@Home acquired Blue Mountain Arts in 1999 for $780
19
million. Even those Internet companies that are recognized as the

http://www.ecommerce.gov/ecomnews/ecommerce2000annual.pdf.
18. Jim Hu, American Greetings Buys Excite Unit, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 13,
2001, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-272977.html.
19. Sandeep Junnarkar, Excite@Home Buys Online Greeting Card Site for $780
Million, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 25, 1999, at http://news.com.com/2100-1040231860.html.
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elite, such as Amazon.com, are having difficulty turning a profit.
In the good old days of the Internet, e-businesses were able to
thrive on ever increasing deficits and no realistic plan for becoming
profitable in the foreseeable future. These good old days of the
Internet, while not a distant memory by any real-world definition,
are quite distant digital memories.
To be sure, the growth of the technology companies that make
up the NASDAQ has been curtailed. The naysayers and prophets of
doom, who are peddling the collapse of both tech companies and
e-business alike, greatly exaggerate the early demise of the industry.
The technology industry will undoubtedly go through
restructuring, but technology does not stand still, and Americans
are unlikely to have their thirst for high tech gadgets quenched any
time soon. This truth is most certainly evidenced by the fact that in
2000, nearly forty-two percent of American households were
connected to the Internet—up sharply from the twenty-six percent
21
that were connected in 1998. Quite simply, the Internet and the
World Wide Web are now a way of life for many Americans, and
there is no reason to believe that the rapid, dynamic and unbridled
growth of the Internet will come to an end any time soon, or ever.
Undoubtedly, however, e-businesses will mature out of necessity.
Profits will increasingly matter to investors, and chief executive
officers everywhere will learn that the World Wide Web is a tool to
be exploited and does not in and of itself provide the silver bullet
that will allow the closing of brick and mortar stores and the
cessation of real-world customer service and support.
B. The Technology That Makes the Internet Work
Unfortunately, because of the nature of the Internet, it is
exceedingly difficult to define what the Internet is with any
precision or accuracy. Many courts have tried to provide a
meaningful structural definition for this dynamic communications
medium. The best such attempt still remains the description

20. On January 22, 2002, Amazon.com, the world’s leading online retailer,
showed its first profit (albeit of only one cent per share) since its inception in
1995. Charles Abrams, Commentary: An E-Tailing Milestone, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan.
23, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2009-1017-821238.html.
21. NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FALLING
THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION, Oct. 2000, available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/contents00.html; graph available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/chartI-3.htm.
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provided in 1996 by the court in American Civil Liberties Union v.
22
Reno, defining the Internet as follows:
The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather
a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller
groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a network
of networks. This is best understood if one considers what
a linked group of computers—referred to here as a
“network”—is, and what it does. Small networks are now
ubiquitous (and are often called “local area networks”).
For example, in many United States Courthouses,
computers are linked to each other for the purpose of
exchanging files and messages (and to share equipment
23
such as printers). These are networks.
Unfortunately, this definition, while actually quite good, is not
extremely useful for those who are not already familiar with
computers. Creating an even further problem is that any definition
of the Internet may well become inappropriate as time passes and
technology advances. This is true because so much of the Internet’s
substance depends on state-of-the-art technology and its
implementation.
The Internet is a redundant series of linked computers over
24
which information travels. In essence, the Internet is a giant
network that connects vast numbers of smaller groups of linked
computer networks. The nature of the Internet makes it very
difficult, if not nearly impossible, to determine the number of
25
computers that are linked together. The computers and networks
that together make up the Internet are owned by private
individuals,
public
companies,
universities,
non-profit
organizations, and governments. Each of the aforementioned
groups have different needs for the technology and—therefore—
will use, access, and exploit the Internet in a number of different
ways. The result is a decentralized, and sometimes chaotic, global
medium of communication that knows no jurisdictional or
26
geographic boundaries. This communications medium allows any
22. 929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
23. Id. at 830-31.
24. Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F.Supp. 2d 737, 745 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (citing Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 164, 171
(S.D.N.Y.1997).
25. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d 473, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
26. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 486 (1997). For a more detailed treatment of
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of the literally tens of millions of people with Internet access to
simultaneously,
and
almost
instantaneously,
exchange
27
information. This instant gratification means that people all over
the world can communicate with digital neighbors, some of whom
are next door, and some of whom are on the other side of the
globe. In addition, e-merchants are able to be open twenty-four
hours, seven days a week. With ever-increasing numbers of Internet
users and e-customers, the ability to do e-business is fast becoming
a prerequisite for real-world companies that attempt to grow with
the economic times.
While being open twenty-four hours, seven days a week and
having a reliable, easy-to-use web presence is critical for any
business, those that wish to rise to the top and define the next
generation of e-business are increasingly attempting to exploit
intellectual property rights in cyberspace. This truth should,
however, come as no surprise to those specializing in intellectual
property law, or to those who are students of the business world.
Intellectual property has always proved to be a highly efficient
barrier to entry. By its very nature, intellectual property rights are
exclusive, which means that intellectual property rights provide the
holder of those rights with the opportunity to prevent others from
engaging in a certain behavior. In terms of the patent grant, the
exclusive right allows the patent-right holder to prevent others
from making, using, selling and/or importing a product that is
28
covered by the patent.

Internet jurisdictional issues, see Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., The Evolution of Internet
Jurisdiction: What a Long Strange Trip It Has Been, 2000 SYRACUSE L. & TECH. J. 1
(2000), available at http://www.law.syr.edu/studentlife/pdf/article.pdf (last
visited Feb. 1, 2002).
27. ACLU, 31 F.Supp. 2d at 482.
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2001); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2001). Courts have
consistently held that the patent holder’s reward, his exclusive right to practice an
invention, is unlimited by the law. The only limits on the patent holder’s exercise
of its exclusive rights are created by the demand for the product embodied in the
invention. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996) (“Thus, the Patent Act creates an incentive
for innovation. The economic rewards during the period of exclusivity are the
carrot. The patent owner expends resources in expectation of receiving this
reward. Upon grant of the patent, the only limitation on the size of the carrot
should be the dictates of the marketplace.”); United States v. Studiengesellschaft
Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The patent gives [the
holder] the unlimited right to exclude others from utilizing its process.”); Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (“the essence of a patent
grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.”).
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Perhaps the most direct evidence supporting the proposition
that corporate America is increasingly attempting to exploit
intellectual property rights in cyberspace is the long delay a patent
29
applicant faces when seeking to obtain a business method patent.
These long delays are due to the shear number of business method
patent applications filed in the Patent Office, and they certainly
evidence corporate interest in this new form of intellectual
30
property right.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW
A. General Introduction to the Patent Grant & the USPTO
A patent is a legal right granted by the United States
government to inventors of new, useful, and non-obvious
31
inventions. The authority to grant patents is bestowed upon the
32
United States Congress by the Constitution, which gives Congress
“the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the

29. Despite what the USPTO proclaims, patent attorneys who draft and
prosecute business method and e-commerce patents advise their clients that they
must be willing to patiently wait for anywhere between two to four years before
they will receive a first office action from the examiner assigned to the patent
application.
30. Up until the landmark decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999), business method
patents were considered unpatentable. For further discussion of the genesis of
both business method patents see infra Part IV(B).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) (new and useful); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001) (nonobvious).
32. Under the authority of the United States Constitution the Congress has
from time to time enacted various laws relating to patents. E.g., The American
Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999); Act of
July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792; Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. The first
Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 stat.
109. The Patent Act, which has undergone several major revisions since its
enactment, had its last major revision in 1952. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66
Stat. 792. More recently, the Patent Act was revised in several significant ways by
the enactment of the American Inventor’s Protection Act, which was enacted into
law on November 29, 1999 as Public Law 106-113. The USPTO maintains a Web
site devoted to explaining this legislation and how it changed Title 35. See United
States Patent and Trademark Office, American Inventor’s Protection Act, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/aipa/index.htm (last visited Feb.
1, 2002). The site also contains the full text of the enacted legislation. Id.
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”
To patent attorneys, this clause of the Constitution will forever be
known as the Patent Clause. For attorneys specializing in copyright
law, this clause is known as the Copyright Clause. It is better,
perhaps, to recognize that our founding fathers deemed
intellectual property rights so fundamentally important to the
success and stability of our new country that these rights were
written into the Constitution, a document not generally known for
its length or specificity.
The right conferred by the patent grant is, in the language of
the statute and of the grant itself, “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the
34
United States or “importing” the invention into the United States.
The patent owner enjoys this exclusive right for a term of twenty
years from the date on which the patent application is filed in the
35
United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO” or “PTO”).
36
The role of the PTO is to examine and, if appropriate, grant
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2001), which states:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the
invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering
for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the
United States, products made by that process, referring to the
specification for the particulars thereof.
See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), which states:
Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in
the United States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an
earlier filed application or applications under section120, 121, or 365(c)
of this title, from the date on which the earliest such application was
filed.
36. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is a non-commercial
federal entity and one of fourteen bureaus in the Department of Commerce
(“DOC”). United States Patent and Trademark Office, Our Business: An Introduction
to the PTO, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2002). The office occupies a combined total of over 1,400,000 square feet in
numerous buildings in Arlington, Virginia and employs over 5,000 full time
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37

patents for the protection of inventions. In discharging its patentrelated duties, the Patent and Trademark Office examines
applications and grants patents on inventions when applicants are
entitled to them. It publishes and disseminates patent information,
records assignments of patents, maintains search files of U.S. and
foreign patents, and maintains a search room for public use in
examining issued patents and records. It supplies copies of patents
and official records to the public. The PTO will only issue a patent
if all of the following patentability requirements are met: (1) utility,
38
(2) novelty, (3) nonobviousness, and (4) adequate description.
B. Patentable Subject Matter in General — 35 U.S.C. § 101
Perhaps the first, and certainly the most basic, question with
respect to patentability is whether or not the claimed invention
consists of patentable subject matter. In other words, is the claimed
invention something that the patent laws are designed to protect?
In this regard, section 101 of Title 35 states, “Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
39
requirements of this title.”
The Legislative History of the 1952 Patent Act inform us that
Congress intended the patentable subject matter referred to in
section 101 to “include anything under the sun that is made by
40
man.”
Given that Congress intended everything made by man to be
patentable it is sometimes more helpful when discussing patentable
subject matter to search for that which cannot be patented. In this
regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently

equivalent staff to support its major functions, which include the examination and
issuance of patents and the examination and registration of trademarks. Id.
37. The USPTO is also charged with the duty of examining and registering
trademarks. The PTO is split up into two offices, the Patent Office and the
Trademark Office. Id. In order to practice in front of the Patent Office it is
necessary to take and pass the Patent Bar Examination, and the only individuals
allowed to sit for the examination are those with a scientific education. There is,
however, no similar examination given by the Trademark Office, and any attorney
admitted to practice in any state may practice before the Trademark Office.
38. See infra sections III.B to III.G.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
40. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, 2d Sess., at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, 2d Sess.,
at 6 (1952); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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stated that there are only three categories of subject matter for
which one may not obtain patent protection: (1) laws of nature, (2)
41
natural phenomena, and (3) abstract ideas. In elaborating on this
point the Supreme Court has explained:
[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc²; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to
42
all men and reserved exclusively to none.”
Today, there are few questions with respect to patentable
subject matter. From time to time, the PTO does attempt to
breathe new life into rejections for want of patentable subject
matter, but ultimately the legislative history and the guidance of
the Supreme Court is clear.
C. The Utility Requirement — 35 U.S.C. § 101
To satisfy the requirements of section 101, a patentee must not
only demonstrate that the subject matter of the invention is
patentable, but he must also demonstrate that the claimed
43
invention is “useful” for some purpose. This statement of utility,
44
while necessary, can be made either explicitly or implicitly. The
utility requirement finds its foundation in the belief that an
invention that is inoperative is not a “useful” invention within the
meaning of section 101 and, therefore, does not deserve patent
45
protection. For a claimed invention to violate the utility
requirement it must be “totally incapable of achieving a useful
46
result.” Therefore, an invention that is at least partially useful will
pass muster under section 101, and the PTO will not issue a utility
47
rejection.
41. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Excluded from such patent
protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. An idea of
itself is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either
of them an exclusive right.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. at 309.
42. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
44. Id.
45. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
46. Id.
47. See MPEP, supra note 8, § 2107(II)(B).
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Notwithstanding the extremely low utility hurdle, claimed
inventions can and do fail the utility requirement. An invention
that fails the utility requirement does so for one of two reasons.
First, an applicant can fail to identify any specific utility for the
invention or fail to disclose enough information about the
invention to make its utility immediately apparent to those familiar
with the technological field of the invention. Second, the
48
applicant’s asserted utility for the invention may not be credible.
A good example of the latter is an invention claiming to be a
49
perpetual motion machine.
It is important to remember, however, that the PTO has the
initial burden of challenging the applicant’s assertion of utility.
This is true because the applicant’s assertion of utility in the
50
disclosure will be initially presumed to be correct. “Only [if] the
PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art
would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to
the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince
51
[the PTO] of the invention’s asserted utility.”
An assertion by the patentee regarding utility will be credible
unless: (1) the logic underlying the assertion is seriously flawed, or
(2) the facts upon which the assertion is based are inconsistent with
52
the logic underlying the assertion. Credibility as used in this
context refers to the reliability of the statement based on the logic
and facts that are offered by the applicant to support the assertion
of utility. One situation where an assertion of utility would not be
considered credible is where a person of ordinary skill would
consider the assertion to be incredible in view of contemporary
knowledge, and where the applicant has not provided any
information to counter that which the contemporary knowledge
53
suggests. Again, a perpetual motion machine is a good example.

48. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1966); MPEP, supra note 8,
§ 2107(II)(B)(1)(ii).
49. See MPEP, supra note 8, § 2107.01(II), § 608.03 (“With the exception of
cases involving perpetual motion, a model is not ordinarily required by the Office
to demonstrate the operativeness of a device.”), and § 706.03(a).
50. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re Bundy, 642
F.2d 430, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1981)); see also MPEP, supra note 8, § 2164.07.
51. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566.
52. MPEP, supra note 8, §§ 706.03, 2107.01(II).
53. MPEP, supra note 8, § 2107.10(II)(C)(2)(ii).
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D. The Novelty Requirement — 35 U.S.C. § 102
Despite the impression given by the low hurdle presented by
the first two patentability requirements, not every invention is
patentable. One of the most common problems for applications is
54
section 102, which sets forth the doctrine of anticipation by
requiring novelty of invention. Essentially, section 102 requires the
applicant for the patent to demonstrate that the invention is new.
Absolute “newness” is not required, but those who are first to
invent must soon thereafter file for a patent application or risk the
55
loss of patent rights. In order to understand the requirements of
54. 35 U.S.C.§ 102 (2001) states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless —
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the
subject of an inventor’s certificate, by the applicant or his legal
representative or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the
application for patent in this country on an application for patent or
inventor’s certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of
the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for
patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another
who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of
section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented,
or
(g) before the applicant’s invention thereof the invention was made in
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to
practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who
was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
55. A detailed discussion of novelty is beyond the scope of this paper. Those
familiar with patent law will appreciate the numerous nuances associated with a
true understanding of novelty. For purposes of this article it will be sufficient for
the reader to understand that, generally speaking, in order for a patent to issue
the invention embodied by the patent application must be new (i.e., one that has
not been made previously). For a more detailed exposition of the novelty
requirement, see 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 et seq. (2001).

01QUINN.DOC

2002]

2/15/2002 5:30 PM

PATENT MISUSE IN CYBERSPACE

971

section 102, it will be helpful to explore the concept of anticipation
in a little detail.
1. Anticipation Generally
A claim is said to be “anticipated” if comparison of the claimed
invention with a prior art reference reveals that each and every
element in the claim under attack is shown or described,
organized, and functioning in substantially the same manner as in
56
the prior art reference. Anticipation is perhaps most easily
understood as the converse of infringement: “that which infringes,
57
if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” As Judge Hand explained:
No doctrine of the patent law is better established than
that a prior patent or other publication to be an
anticipation must bear within its four corners adequate
directions for the practice of the patent invalidated. If the
earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for
further experiments, if its teaching will sometimes
succeed and sometimes fail, if it does not inform the art
without more how to practice the new invention, it has
not correspondingly enriched the store of common
58
knowledge, and it is not an anticipation.
2. Anticipation Test
The standard for anticipation is a rigorous one; requiring that
every element of the claimed invention, as arranged in the claim,
be disclosed either specifically or inherently by a single prior art
59
reference. Every element of the challenged claim need not be
expressly delineated in a single prior art reference, but may be
inherently disclosed by prior art if “the prior art necessarily
functions in accordance with the limitations” of the challenged
60
claim. However, if the court must go beyond a single prior art
56. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
57. Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 228 (1893).
58. Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Hand, J.).
59. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,
976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik GMBH, v. Am. Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
60. King, 801 F.2d at 1326; see also Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor
Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992).
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reference, the proper challenge is under section 103 for
61
obviousness, not section 102 for novelty. A reference will,
however, anticipate a claim if it discloses the claimed invention
such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination
with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession
62
of the invention.
E. The Nonobviousness Requirement — 35 U.S.C. § 103
Obviousness is a critical element to patentability. In essence,
even if the applicant can demonstrate patentable subject matter,
utility and novelty, the patent will not issue if the invention is trivial.
In order to determine if an invention is trivial it is necessary to see
if there was motivation in the prior art to do what the inventor has
done. If the prior art does not explicitly, and with identity of
elements, teach the invention, the patent applicant may still be
thwarted if there are a number of references that, when combined,
would produce the claimed invention. In order to determine
whether an invention is obvious we must turn to section 103 of
Title 35, which states:
(a)A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
(b)[Regarding biotechnological patents]
(c)Subject matter developed by another person, which
qualifies as prior art only under one or more of
subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title,
shall not preclude patentability under this section where
the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the
time the invention was made, owned by the same person
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same
person.

61. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1577.
62. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Donohue, 766 F.2d
531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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1. Obviousness Generally
A patent may not be obtained if it contains only obvious
differences from prior art. An invention is obvious if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. “[T]he obviousness inquiry is highly fact-specific and not
63
susceptible to per se rules.” A Defendant cannot simply present
evidence of anticipation and then say, “ditto” to establish
64
obviousness. Nevertheless, for a patent to be nonobvious it must
display “ingenuity beyond the compass” of a person of ordinary
65
skill in the art.
2. The Obviousness Factors — A Factual Inquiry
The obviousness determination is based on four factual
inquiries, outlined in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Systems
Corp.:
(1) the differences between the prior art and challenged
claims, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the field of the
pertinent art at the time of plaintiff’s invention, (3) what
one possessing that level of skill would have deemed to be
obvious from the prior art reference, and (4) objective
66
evidence of obviousness or nonobviousness.
Notwithstanding these factual inquiries, objective evidence of
obviousness or nonobviousness must also be considered before
reaching a conclusion on obviousness. Objective evidence includes:
(1) the commercial success of the invention, (2) whether the
invention satisfied a long-felt need in the industry, (3) failure of
others to find a solution to the problem at hand, and (4)
67
unexpected results.
63. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
64. See Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299, 303 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (noting that evidence of anticipation does not equate with evidence of
obviousness).
65. Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d 793, 794 (2d Cir. 1925)
(Learned Hand, J.).
66. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); ; Hoover Group,
66 F.3d at 303.
67. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); see also B.F. Goodrich, 72 F.3d at 1582.
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In determining what would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art, the decision-maker may examine the
following factors: (1) type of problems encountered in the art; (2)
prior art solutions to those problems; (3) rapidity with which
innovations are made; (4) sophistication of the technology; (5)
educational level of the inventor; and (6) educational level of active
68
workers in the field.
When faced with the question of whether e-commerce patents
should issue, obviousness is the major hurdle for the patent
application to overcome. This is true because given the new and
fast developing technology that makes up the Internet, and given
the relative infancy of business method patents, rarely will it be the
case that the exact e-commerce solution has significant, or any,
prior art patents.
F. Description Requirement — 35 U.S.C. § 112
1. The Enablement and Best Mode Requirements —
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.
The crux of the description requirement, which is embodied
in 35 U.S.C. § 112, is the enablement requirement and the best
mode requirement. Both the enablement and best mode
requirements can be found in the first paragraph of section 112,
which states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use
the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The enablement requirement requires the inventor to
describe his or her invention in a manner that would allow others
in the industry to make and use the invention. “Enablement looks
to placing the subject matter of the claims generally in the
69
possession of the public.”
68. Envtl. Designs v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
69. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
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The best mode requirement requires the inventor to disclose
his or her preferred way of carrying out the invention at the time
the patent application is filed. There is no requirement that the
inventor’s preferred embodiment be updated as the patent
application works its way through the PTO. Best mode looks to
whether specific instrumentalities and techniques have been
developed by the inventor and are known to him, at the time of
70
filing, as the best way of carrying out the invention.
Thus, the enablement requirement looks to the objective
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, while the best mode
inquiry is a subjective, factual one—looking to the state of the mind
of the inventor.
G. Adequate Description Requirement — 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2
The other important aspect of the description requirement is
found in the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, which states:
“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention.” This requirement is
perhaps the most fundamental requirement of patentability. It is
the claims that define the invention, and those claims must
describe the invention in adequate detail.
IV. THE HISTORY OF E-COMMERCE PATENTS
In order to understand the concerns of some in the Internet
industry regarding e-commerce patents, it is first necessary to
explore the history of e-commerce patents. This history begins with
the patentability of computer software, proceeds to the business
method exception, and then ultimately finds itself looking at the
intersection of the two: the creation of e-commerce patents.
A. The History of Software Patents
1. The Evolution Begins — Gottschalk v. Benson
Since the United States Supreme Court addressed the
71
patentability of computer software in Gottschalk v. Benson, there
70. Id.; Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
71. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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has been considerable change in the law surrounding whether
computer software is entitled to patent protection. In Benson, the
Court was faced with an invention that was described by the patent
itself as being related to the “processing of data by program and
more particularly to the programmed conversion of numerical
72
information” in general-purpose digital computers.
The
applicants for the patent claimed a method for converting binarycoded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals. However, the
claims in the patent application were not limited to any particular
art or technology, any particular apparatus or machinery, or any
73
particular end use. Quite to the contrary, the claims of the patent
application itself purported to cover any use of the claimed method
74
in a general-purpose digital computer of any type. The fact that
the claims did not have any type of limitation on use weighed
heavily on the minds of the Justices and certainly dictated the
outcome of the case.
In beginning its analysis of whether computer software
deserves patent protection, the Court began by recognizing that
“[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with
75
the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.” The Benson Court
also recalled the familiar and often cited language found in its
76
decision in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.:
He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a
discovery, it must come from the application of the law of
77
nature to a new and useful end.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the patent claims in
question were related to a process that employed a mathematical
formula to achieve the end goal, the Court went on to hold that the
mathematical formula involved in this case had no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital

72. Id. at 64.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 67 (citing Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939)).
76. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
77. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S.
127, 130 (1948)).
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78

computer. Such a determination necessarily meant, in the
opinion of the Supreme Court, that if the patent were to be valid, it
would completely preempt the mathematical formula—the
practical effect being the protection of the algorithm in and of
79
itself, something that could not be tolerated. Therefore, the
patent in question, a patent on the conversion of binary code into
pure binary numbers, could not and did not stand. The effect of
the Benson decision was to prevent the patenting of all computer
software, at least at this time.
2. Rethinking Patentability — Diamond v. Diehr
Almost a decade after the Benson decision, the Supreme Court
80
in Diamond v. Diehr first recognized that a computer program
might indeed be deserving of patent protection under the
appropriate circumstances. The patent in question in Diehr claimed
a method of operating a molding press during the production of
81
rubber articles. The inventors asserted that their method ensured
that the articles would remain in the press for the appropriate
length of time. In finding this software patentable, the Supreme
Court explained:
a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does
not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula, computer program, or digital
82
computer.
....
[a] process is not unpatentable simply because it contains
a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm. It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection. As Justice
Stone explained four decades ago: “While a scientific
truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created
83
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”
....

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72.
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 187-88 (internal citations omitted).
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. . . [The equation used in the claimed method] is not
patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing
rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient
solution of the equation, that process is at the very least
84
not barred at the threshold by § 101.
The effect of the Diehr decision was to open the door for the
possibility that some computer programs were entitled to patent
protection. For this reason, Diehr can be thought of as a significant
departure from Benson, and the first significant step toward the
patentability of business method and electronic commerce patents.
3. Federal Circuit Evolution — From Freeman-Walter-Abele to
Alappat & Beyond
For some time after the Diehr decision, when faced with the
question of whether a computer program deserved patent
protection, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit applied what was known as the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. This
test was applied when it was necessary to determine whether a
computer program was patentable subject matter pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 101. The Freeman-Walter-Abele test was succinctly set forth by
the Federal Circuit in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
85
Corazonix Corp. as follows:
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is
recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next
determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is
no more than the algorithm itself; that is, whether the
claim is directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not
applied to or limited by physical elements or process
steps. Such claims are nonstatutory. However, when the
mathematical algorithm is applied in one or more steps of
an otherwise statutory process claim, or one or more
elements of an otherwise statutory apparatus claim, the
86
requirements of section 101 are met.
Several years after Arrhythmia, however, the Federal Circuit
seemed to abandon the Freeman-Walter-Abele test when, sitting en
87
banc in In re Alappat, the court did not apply the Freeman-WalterAbele test to determine if the computer software in question was

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 188 (internal citations omitted).
958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1058.
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

01QUINN.DOC

2002]

2/15/2002 5:30 PM

PATENT MISUSE IN CYBERSPACE

979

patentable. Instead, the Federal Circuit opted to apply the
mathematical subject matter exception, explaining:
[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with the so called
mathematical subject matter exception to § 101 alleged
herein is to see whether the claimed subject matter as a
whole is a disembodied mathematical concept, whether
categorized as a mathematical formula, mathematical
equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in
essence represents nothing more than a “law of nature,”
“natural phenomenon,” or “abstract idea.” If so, Diehr
88
precludes the patenting of that subject matter.
Also of particular importance from Alappat is the Federal
Circuit’s attempt to explain prior Supreme Court decisions
regarding software patents. In this regard, the Federal Circuit
stated:
[A]t the core of the [Supreme] Court’s analysis in each of
these cases lies an attempt by the Court to explain a rather
straightforward concept, namely, that certain types of
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent
nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some
type of practical application, and thus that subject matter
89
is not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.
While the Alappat court may well have wished the Supreme
Court decisions to be quite so simple, the truth of the matter is that
previous Supreme Court decisions were not at all easy to reconcile.
It seems clear that the Court was addressing each case on a case-bycase basis, which did not lead to a cohesive and well thought out
approach to dealing with software patents. The Federal Circuit, on
the other hand, was over time fine tuning its analysis and
developing a coherent approach, which was designed to yield
consistency and lay the foundation upon which similar cases could
be decided. This expansion of patentability also recognized the
changing face of technology and began to answer the growing
corporate desire to patent software.
Shortly after the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, impliedly did
away with the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in Alappat, a three-judge
90
panel applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in In re Trovato. This
controversial decision did not last long. The Federal Circuit—

88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1543.
42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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acting en banc—withdrew the panel decision, lending further
support to the death of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. While the court
did not mention the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, it did cite Alappat and
made it clear that the Alappat test should be applied to determine
whether computer software is patentable. The court explained that
Alappat had been decided by an en banc panel and reiterated that a
computer program is entitled to patent protection provided all of
the requirements set forth in Title 35 are met. The court went on
to briefly and directly explain:
Consistent with Alappat, the proposed [PTO] guidelines
direct patent examiners to apply all of the requirements
of Title 35 when examining applications claiming
computer software instead of rejecting such applications
under section 101.
On consideration of the combined petition for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing in banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the combined petition for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing in banc is accepted; that the
judgment of this court entered on December 19, 1994 is
vacated; and that the opinion accompanying the
judgment, In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 33 USPQ2d 1194
(Fed. Cir. 1994), is withdrawn.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decisions of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences are vacated,
sua sponte, and the case is remanded for reconsideration
in light of Alappat and any new guidelines adopted by the
Patent and Trademark Office for examination of
92
computer-implemented inventions.
While the Federal Circuit did not mention the mathematical
subject matter exception that was formulated in Alappat, it does
seem clear from the court’s language that the mathematical subject
matter exception is the rule, to the exclusion of the Freeman-WalterAbele test.
Belief that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was fading into the
background and becoming a thing of the past was bolstered when
the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
93
Financial Group, Inc. In that case, the Federal Circuit announced
the so-called mathematical algorithm exception:
91.
92.
93.

In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 807 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added).
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
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The Supreme Court has identified three categories of
subject matter that are unpatentable, namely “laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Of
particular relevance to this case, the Court has held that
mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject
matter to the extent that they are merely abstract ideas. In
Diehr, the Court explained that certain types of
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent
nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some
type of practical application, i.e., “a useful, concrete and
tangible result.”
Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by
showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting
94
disembodied concepts or truths that are not “useful.”
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that “[a]fter
Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any,
applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject
95
matter.” Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held the business method
software patentable because it constituted “a practical application
of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, [that]
96
produces a useful, concrete and tangible result . . . .”
Shortly after the Federal Circuit’s landmark decision in State
Street Bank, the court once again addressed the issue of patentability
of computer software, and rather than contract the breadth of the
State Street Bank decision, the court used the opportunity to
broaden and solidify its position with respect to the patentability of
97
software. In AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed its decisions in State Street Bank and Alappat. In so
doing, the AT&T Court explained:
This court recently pointed out that any step-by-step
process, be it electronic, chemical, or mechanical, involves
an “algorithm” in the broad sense of the term. Because §
101 includes processes as a category of patentable subject
matter, the judicially-defined proscription against
patenting of a “mathematical algorithm,” to the extent
such a proscription still exists, is narrowly limited to
98
mathematical algorithms in the abstract.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1373.
172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999).
Id. at 1356 (citations omitted).
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The Court further explained that the Alappat inquiry, which is
the relevant test when determining patentability if the claimed
matter involves an algorithm,
requires an examination of the contested claims to see if
the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied
mathematical concept representing nothing more than a
“law of nature” or an “abstract idea,” or if the
mathematical concept has been reduced to some practical
application rendering it “useful.” In Alappat, we held that
more than an abstract idea was claimed because the
claimed invention as a whole was directed toward forming
a specific machine that produced the useful, concrete,
99
and tangible result of a smooth waveform display.
Any lingering doubt that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was dead
was put to rest as a result of the court’s decision in AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Communications, Inc. This death of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test
is of particular importance because in order for software to be
patentable under that test, the algorithms in question were
required to be applied to or limited by physical elements or process
steps. Under the mathematical algorithm exception, no such
requirement exists, which will only work to expand the
100
patentability for software programs. The focus of the patentability
inquiry, at least insofar as computer software is involved, is now on
whether the mathematical algorithms, formulas, or calculations in
101
question produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result.” This
shift to a result based inquiry should once and for all lay to rest the
question of whether computer software is in fact patentable subject
102
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
4. The End of the Business Method Exception to Patentability
103

In State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit unceremoniously and
categorically did away with what had previously been known as the
104
The business
“business method exception to patentability.”
method exception was a judicially created exception to
patentability that, when invoked, would render an invention

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1358.
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
Id. at 1375-77.
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unpatentable simply because the subject matter covered in the
105
patent consisted of a method of doing business. In casting away
the business method exception the Federal Circuit stated:
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception
to rest. Since its inception, the “business method”
exception has merely represented the application of some
general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps
arising out of the “requirement for invention”—which was
eliminated by § 103. Since the 1952 Patent Act, business
methods have been, and should have been, subject to the
same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any
106
other process or method.
Laying to rest the business method exception, however, was
not in reality what the Federal Circuit accomplished in State Street
Bank. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit went out of its way to
explain that the business method exception had really never
107
existed in the first place. The Court explained that neither it nor
its predecessor court, the C.C.P.A., had ever applied the business
108
method exception. Furthermore, the court explained that the
cases often relied upon as supporting the business method
109
110
exemption, In re Maucorps and In re Meyer, were both rendered
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr and prior to the
111
Federal Circuit abandoning the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.
Moreover, the court pointed out that the often-cited Maucorps and
Meyer cases did not address whether business method patents were
patentable subject matter under some phantom doctrine related
112
only to business methods. To be sure, these cases did indeed deal
with business method patents, but the C.C.P.A. did not rely on the
so-called business method exception. Rather, the C.C.P.A. found
113
the inventions unpatentable under the mathematical exception.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are ‘Methods of Doing Business’ Finally Out
of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 435 (1998).
109. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (dealing with a business methodology for
deciding how salesmen “should best handles respective customers”).
110. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (involving a system for aiding a neurologist
in diagnosing patients).
111. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1376, n.14.
112. Id. at 1376.
113. Id.
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B. The Rise of E-commerce Patents
As already discussed, an e-commerce patent is nothing more
than a software patent that has application to the Internet.
E-businesses are increasingly attempting to exploit patent
rights in cyberspace. This truth should come as no surprise to those
specializing in intellectual property law, or to those who are
students of the business world. Obtaining patents has always been a
highly efficient way to erect barriers to entry and thereby protect
market share, to the extent possible. By its very nature, the patent
grant is exclusive, which means that patents provide the owner of
the exclusive right with the opportunity to prevent others from
engaging in a certain behavior—namely competitive behavior.
Ordinarily, it is not a significant problem that the exclusive
rights conveyed by a patent can, and do, frequently lead to an
artificial, restricted, and anticompetitive market. In order to
encourage the level of invention that we require as a society, we
deem the limited exclusivity of the patent grant to be on one hand
loathesome, and on the other hand incredibly necessary. It is
because of the latter, the necessity of invention, that we tolerate the
limited exclusivity embodied by patents.
The question becomes, “why do e-commerce patents pose a
threat any more pronounced than does any other type of patent?”
In an ideal world, one in which the requirements for patentability
are adhered to, business method and e-commerce patents would
not pose any unique threat. The unique threat that the new
economy is facing is not because of any failing in the delicate
balance struck by the patent laws, but rather because that delicate
balance is being thrown askew. The PTO is overwhelmed with
applications seeking the protection of business method patents, yet
at the same time the PTO has little or no meaningful prior art to
judge the allegedly patentable inventions that are being submitted
by applicants. This, together with the fact that there is no duty to
114
conduct a search prior to filing a patent application,
and
certainly no duty to search prior to initiating a patent infringement
suit, leads to inefficient prosecution and the issuance of patents
114. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 requires a duty of candor of all those substantively
involved with the prosecution of a patent. What Rule 56 does not require,
however, is the patent applicant, or anyone involved in the prosecution of the
patent application, to conduct a patent search and/or otherwise look for prior art.
For more detailed treatment of the lack of a duty to search, and a proposal that
suggests the adoption of a duty to search, see Quinn, supra note 14.
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that do not objectively meet the critical requirements of
115
patentability.
A mere glance at some of the issued e-commerce patents leads
one to the inescapable conclusion that something is amiss. For
example, as already discussed, it is indeed hard to understand why
Priceline.com was able to obtain US Patent No. 5,797,127 on a
116
Dutch auction conducted via use of Internet technology.
117
Likewise, it is difficult to understand why Mob Shop, Inc. was able
to obtain a United States patent on what the company calls
118
“demand aggregation,” which is nothing more than cooperative
buying. As the issued patent explains:
This invention allows sellers conveniently to offer
“Demand-Based Pricing”, that is, prices which go down as
the volume of units sold in any given offer goes up. A
seller can therefor offer volume discounts to buyers acting
as a group, even when the buyers may not have any formal
119
relationship with one another.
Mob Shop apparently has no plans to bring any infringement
suit to enforce their exclusive right with respect to cooperative
buying, but they do plan on licensing the invention to other
120
e-businesses that utilize group-buying techniques. Mob Shop’s
plan not to enforce its patent rights by way of an infringement suit
indicates the heart of the problem created by the proliferation of
e-commerce patents. One can speculate that Mob Shop has ruled
out enforcement by way of litigation because it fears that its patent
would not survive the inevitable invalidity defense. Nevertheless, it
is going to use the presumption of validity to attempt to extract
licensing payments. It is this type of “legalized licensing
121
extortion” that threatens entrepreneurship in the new digital
115. These requirements, set forth in Part III of this article, are: (1) patentable
subject matter; (2) utility; (3) novelty; (4) non-obviousness; and (5) adequate
description. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
116. A more detailed analysis of the Priceline.com Dutch auction patent can
be found in Part I of this article.
117. Mob Shop was formerly called, “Accompany.” Carolyn Said, Innovative Web
Retailer Mercata Folds, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL
3391359.
118. U.S. Patent No. 6,269,343 (issued July 31, 2001) (“On-line marketing
system and method”).
119. Id.
120. Press Release, Mob Shop, Inc., Mob Shop Inc. Receives Group Purchasing
Patent (Aug. 1, 2001),.available at http://www.accompany.com/pr080101.htm.
121. I do not wish to question in any way the legitimate practice of licensing
technology. In a free market we must have rights that can be traded. In the first
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economy. Even before opening a new business, Internet
entrepreneurs will be forced not only to go through the trials and
tribulations associate with opening any new enterprise, but they will
also face a growing number of questionable patents. The owners of
these questionable patents will seek royalties, which will work the
same evil as over-burdensome business taxation. At some point, it
may be easier for the would-be Internet entrepreneur to decide
against doing business in cyberspace—an outcome that would be
detrimental to our economy and in direct opposition to
governmental policy; including our patent policy, which favors and
encourages entrepreneurial spirit.
There are, of course, other examples of highly questionable
e-commerce patents, including a number of Amazon.com patents.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand why Amazon.com was able to
122
obtain U.S. Patent No. 6,029,141, regarding an on-line customer
referral system known in the e-commerce world as either an
affiliate program or an associates program. While the ‘141 patent
may raise some eyebrows, Amazon.com has received the most
123
attention with their one-click patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411.
The ‘411 patent is quite simply titled, “Method and system for
placing a purchase order via a communications network,” and is
directed to a method and system for “single action” ordering of
124
items via a communications network, such as the Internet. In the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com,
125
Inc., Judge Clevenger succinctly explained what the ‘411 patent
covers:
The ‘411 patent describes a method and system in which a
consumer can complete a purchase order for an item via
an electronic network using only a “single action,” such as
the click of a computer mouse button on the client
computer system. Amazon developed the patent to cope
with what it considered to be frustrations presented by
instance this requires a right (i.e., a patent) and in the second instance it requires
a regime through which one to one negotiation and reallocation of rights can take
place. There are many legitimate reasons for licensing technology and know-how.
When referring to “legalized licensing extortion” I mean to call into question the
two step business practice of obtaining a highly questionable patent and then
licensing the so-called innovation without any belief that the patent is objectively
valid and deserving of the presumption of validity.
122. U.S. Patent No. 6,029,141 (issued Feb. 22, 2000) [hereinafter ‘141].
123. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) [hereinafter ‘141].
124. Id.
125. 239 F.3d. 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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what is known as the “shopping cart model” purchase
system for electronic commerce purchasing events. In
previous incarnations of the shopping cart model, a
purchaser using a client computer system (such as a
personal computer executing a web browser program)
could select an item from an electronic catalog, typically
by clicking on an “Add to Shopping Cart” icon, thereby
placing the item in the “virtual” shopping cart. Other
items from the catalog could be added to the shopping
cart in the same manner. When the shopper completed
the selecting process, the electronic commercial event
would move to the check-out counter, so to speak. Then,
information regarding the purchaser’s identity, billing
and shipping addresses, and credit payment method
would be inserted into the transactional information base
by the soon-to-be purchaser. Finally, the purchaser would
“click” on a button displayed on the screen or somehow
issue a command to execute the completed order, and the
server computer system would verify and store the
126
information concerning the transaction.
It seems hardly possible that such a patent could meet the
requirements for patentability. It would appear as if the
Amazon.com one-click patent was nothing more than the
computerized version of running a tab, or perhaps the
computerized version of having a standing order for the shipment
127
of goods. Why should such an old and routine business practice
deserve new life and exclusive rights simply because it can now be
carried out via the Internet? Surely prior art for such an invention
must include both business models, computer technology and
communication technology. Why then were these related and
relevant fields not combined to lead to a rejection?
Notwithstanding the serious questions associated with whether
such a quasi-invention should be entitled to patent protection, in
Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, the Federal Circuit was faced
with a situation where Barnesandnoble.com was appealing the
128
issuance of a preliminary injunction entered against them. The
Federal Circuit, after going through the claims and prosecution
history, agreed with Amazon.com that Barnesandnoble.com was
126. Id. at 1347.
127. Id. at 1348.
128. Id. The district court’s decision ordering the preliminary injunction can
be found at Amazon.com, Inc., v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F.Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D.
Wash. 1999).
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operating within the claims of the ‘411 patent. The court,
however, agreed with Barnesandnoble.com that there was indeed a
130
very strong case supporting invalidity. For this reason, the Federal
131
Circuit refused to uphold the preliminary injunction. Although
the denial of a preliminary injunction certainly does not speak to
the ultimate merits of the invalidity defense proffered by
Barnesandnoble.com, it does bring into substantial doubt the
viability of the Amazon.com one-click patent. Of particular
importance is the fact that Barnesandnoble.com was able to locate
no fewer than four pieces of prior art that were directly on point
132
and not considered in the original prosecution.
Yet, the
Amazon.com one-click patent carried into the litigation the
presumption of validity, a very powerful sword in the hands of the
patent owner.
V. UNDERSTANDING PATENT MISUSE
The term “patent misuse” refers to specific types of prohibited
behavior engaged in by the owner of the patent rights. Patent
misuse is an affirmative defense that recognizes that it is possible
for a patent owner to abuse the exclusive right enjoyed as a result
133
of the issuance of a patent. As an affirmative defense, patent
misuse cannot be used as a sword, but can only be used as a shield
by an alleged infringer if and when the patent owner seeks to
enforce the exclusive right of the patent in a patent infringement
134
suit. Once a patent infringement suit is initiated, the alleged
infringer, in order to successfully rely upon the patent misuse
defense, must “show that the patentee has impermissibly
broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant
135
with anticompetitive effect.”
If the alleged infringer can
demonstrate that the patent owner did engage in prohibited
behavior, the patent will be unenforceable despite the fact that it is
129. Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1357.
130. Id. at 1359-60 (“When the heft of the asserted prior art is assessed in light
of the correct legal standards, we conclude that BN has mounted a serious
challenge to the validity of Amazon’s patent.”).
131. Id. at 1366.
132. Id. at 1360-66.
133. Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
134. Id. at 868.
135. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343
(1971).
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136

valid. In this respect, patent misuse is similar to the doctrine of
137
inequitable conduct, which also works to make an entire patent
138
unenforceable.
The taint placed upon the patent by misuse, however, does not
necessarily require the patent be held unenforceable for all time.
Patent misuse merely prevents the owner of the patent from
139
recovering for infringement for the duration of the misuse. In
this respect, patent misuse is dissimilar to inequitable conduct. To
be sure, inequitable conduct may find itself at the foundation of
the underlying patent misuse defense, but inequitable conduct is
unlike patent misuse in that once it has been determined that there
was inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the patent, the
140
patent is irretrievably unenforceable.
Over the years courts have identified several prohibited
practices that constitute per se patent misuse, including: (1) tying
136. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942); see
also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Patent
misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse renders the patent unenforceable
until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself, invalidate the patent.”).
137. Patent misuse is an equitable doctrine and, therefore, it is no great
surprise that it is similar in many ways to inequitable conduct. See U.S. Gypsum Co.
v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) (providing that patent misuse “is an
extension of the equitable doctrine of ‘unclean hands’ to the patent field”), reh’g
denied, 353 U.S. 932 (1957).
138. The doctrine of inequitable conduct stems from 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, which is
commonly referred to simply as Rule 56. Rule 56 sets forth the duty of candor
placed upon the inventors and any individual substantially involved in the
preparation or prosecution of the patent application. By its express terms Rule 56
requires all those substantively involved in the preparation and prosecution of a
patent application must disclose to the Patent Office all information they are
aware of that is material to the examination of the application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
Those substantively involved in the prosecution of a patent are: (1) Each inventor
named in the application; (2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes
the application; and (3) Every other person who is associated with the inventor,
with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the
application. §§ 1.56(c)(1)-(3). Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56
means that the entire patent is unenforceable. § 1.56(a). For a more detailed
explanation of inequitable conduct, see Quinn, supra note 14.
139. It is possible to regain the right to recover for infringement, but the
patent owner bears the burden of meeting two requirements: (1) the improper
practice must be fully abandoned; and (2) the consequences of the improper
practice must be fully dissipated. If the patent owner meets this burden the patent
misuse will be purged and, the patent owner will once again be able to exercise
exclusive control of that which is covered by the patent. See B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis,
314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942); see also In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 472
F.Supp. 180, 183-84 (D.C. Fla. 1979).
140. Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 489 F.Supp. 1129, 1161-62 (D.C. Ohio
1980).
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agreements, where the patent owner requires in the license
agreement that the licensee of the patent also purchase a
141
separable, staple good; and (2) arrangements that allow the
patent owner to effectively extend the term of the patent, thereby
142
requiring royalty payments after the patent term has expired. In
1988, however, Congress enacted legislation that insulates certain
behavior of the patent owner, thereby making it impossible for
143
patent misuse to apply.
The behavior Congress sought to
legitimize and take from the reach of a patent misuse defense was
144
the refusal to license and tying arrangements in the absence of
145
market power. While at first glance these actions may seem
anticompetitive and deserving of the mantle of patent misuse, this
safe harbor provided for by Congress recognizes the essence of a
patent, which is the right to exclude.
Generally speaking, there are two separate types of prohibited
activity that can lead to a finding of patent misuse. First, if a patent
owner engages in conduct that violates the antitrust laws, and the
antitrust violation is sufficiently related to the patent in question in
the infringement action, the patent owner will be unable to seek
redress and the patent will be unenforceable as a result of patent
146
misuse. The second type of patent misuse occurs when the patent
owner seeks to extend the exclusive rights beyond those
guaranteed by the patent grant. This extension of rights theory is
sometimes referred to as the “extension of the monopoly” doctrine,
and will come into play when the patent owner engages in conduct
that impermissibly broadens the physical or temporal scope of the
147
patent rights granted. Calling this form of patent misuse an
141. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942).
142. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
143. In relevant part, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2001) states:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having done one or more of the following . . . (4) refused to license or
use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights
to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power
in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
license or sale is conditioned.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2001).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d)(5) (2001).
146. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
147. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343
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extension of the monopoly, however, is dangerous because it
perpetuates a myth; namely that a patent is a monopoly. Chief
Judge Markey, the first Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, time and time again reprimanded scholars,
attorneys and fellow judges for characterizing a patent grant as the
148
conferment of a monopoly. In Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp.,
Judge Markey stated:
Nortron begins its file wrapper estoppel argument with
“Patents are an exception to the general rule against
monopolies . . .”. A patent, under the statute, is property.
35 U.S.C. § 261. Nowhere in any statute is a patent
described as a monopoly. The patent right is but the right
to exclude others, the very definition of “property.” That
the property right represented by a patent, like other
property rights, may be used in a scheme violative of
antitrust laws creates no “conflict” between laws
establishing any of those property rights and the antitrust
laws. The antitrust laws, enacted long after the original
patent laws, deal with appropriation of what should
belong to others. A valid patent gives the public what it
did not earlier have. Patents are valid or invalid under the
statute, 35 U.S.C. It is but an obfuscation to refer to a
patent as “the patent monopoly” or to describe a patent as
an “exception to the general rule against monopolies.”
That description, moreover, is irrelevant when
considering patent questions, including the question of
149
estoppel predicated on prosecution history.
Moreover, it is a simple truth that a monopoly can only exist if
there is an existing market. To characterize a patent as a monopoly
without first questioning whether there is a market for the patent is
to put the cart before the horse. To be sure, those patents that are
litigated are litigated because there is money at stake and,
therefore, have a likely market. Nevertheless, there are
undoubtedly a large number of patents that could never possibly
have any market and could never be considered to yield a
monopoly. It does no good to perpetuate the myth that all patents
150
are monopolies. It is simply not true.
(1971); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
148. 713 F.2d 782 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
149. Id. at 786 n.3.
150. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The patent system, which antedated the Sherman Act by a
century, is not an ‘exception’ to the antitrust laws, and patent rights are not legal
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Nevertheless, it is important to understand that if the patent
owner’s conduct does rise to the level of an antitrust violation, it
will constitute patent misuse. A patent owner who brings an
infringement suit, however, may be subject to antitrust liability for
the anticompetitive effects of the suit if and only if the alleged
infringer is able to prove: (1) that the asserted patent was obtained
through knowing and willful fraud; or (2) that the infringement
151
suit was a mere sham.
In order to determine if a patent was obtained through
knowing and willful fraud one may be tempted to look for
inequitable conduct. The knowing and willful fraud that will rise to
the level of an antitrust violation is conduct that is far more severe
than inequitable conduct. This type of fraud is known as Walker
152
Process fraud. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Walker Process, as well as Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, the
Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the C.C.P.A., has distinguished
inequitable conduct from Walker Process fraud, explaining that
inequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept than the
common law fraud needed to support a Walker Process fraud
153
154
counterclaim. In Norton v. Curtiss, the C.C.P.A. distinguished
inequitable conduct from Walker Process fraud by explaining that:
the concept of ‘fraud’ has most often been used by the
courts, in general, to refer to a type of conduct so
reprehensible that it could alone form the basis of an
actionable wrong (e.g., the common law action for
deceit) . . . . Because severe penalties are usually meted
out to the party found guilty of such conduct, technical

monopolies in the antitrust sense of that word.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984);
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1160 n.8 (6th Cir.
1978) (“The loose application of the pejorative term ‘monopoly,’ to the property
right of exclusion represented by a patent, can be misleading. Unchecked it can
destroy the constitutional and statutory scheme reflected in the patent system.”).
151. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
152. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965).
153. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563
(Fed.Cir. 1989); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1417-18 (Fed.Cir.
1987); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1384-85
(Fed. Cir. 1987); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (“Conduct before the PTO that may render a patent unenforceable is
broader than common law fraud.”).
154. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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155

fraud is generally held not to exist unless the following
indispensable elements are found to be present: (1) a
representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a
state of mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is
held to be the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the
party deceived which induces him to act thereon, and (5)
injury to the party deceived as a result of his reliance on
156
the misrepresentation.
Inequitable conduct is indeed a lesser offense than common
law fraud and will not support antitrust liability. As a result, it is
exceedingly difficult to demonstrate patent misuse under a theory
that relies upon the knowing and willful enforcement of an
otherwise invalid patent.
If the alleged infringer is not able to prove Walker Process fraud
they may attempt to demonstrate that the infringement suit was a
mere sham. To demonstrate that the litigation is a mere sham, the
alleged infringer will need to show that the lawsuit is objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
157
expect its success on the merits. If an objective litigant could
possibly conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a
158
favorable outcome, the suit cannot be considered a sham. It will
likewise be necessary for the alleged infringer to demonstrate that
the litigation was brought for no reason other than attempting to
159
directly interfere with the business relationships of a competitor.
Given this strict, unforgiving requirement, it is easy to see how
difficult—if not impossible—it is to demonstrate sham litigation.
Courts, however, have never required a defendant raising the
patent misuse defense to first establish that an antitrust violation
160
has occurred;
such a prerequisite is not envisioned by the
155. We understand from the enumeration of elements that the term
“technical fraud” was used by the court to mean common law fraud.
156. Norton, 433 F.2d at 792-94 and n.12 (citation omitted).
157. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
158. Id.
159. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
160. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Patent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation because of
the economic power that may be derived from the patentee’s right to exclude.
Thus misuse may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not met.”).
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161

defense. In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppinger Co., the Supreme Court
stressed that:
[i]t is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a
successful infringement suit in conjunction with the
patentee’s course of conduct which disqualifies him to
maintain the suit, regardless of whether the particular
defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent . . . .
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has
violated the Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event
the maintenance of the present suit to restrain
petitioner’s manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing
162
machine is contrary to public policy.
The Supreme Court has echoed this understanding on several
other occasions, explaining each time that the condemnation of
patent misuse does not depend upon the showing of an antitrust
163
violation in the first instance.
Similarly, the alleged infringer who is seeking to rely upon the
defense of misuse does not need to establish standing in the
164
antitrust sense. This is true because the true focus of the misuse
inquiry is not personal in nature, but rather revolves around the

161. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
162. Id. at 494.
163. In Transparent-Wrap Machinery Corp. v. Stokes & Smith, 329 U.S. 637, 641
(1947), the Court explained:
The requirement that a licensee under a patent use an unpatented
material or device with the patent might violate the antitrust laws but for
the attempted protection of the patent. Id. The condemnation of the
practice, however, does not depend on such a showing. Though control
of the unpatented article or device falls short of a prohibited restraint of
trade or monopoly, it will not be sanctioned. For it is the tendency in that
direction which condemns the practice and which, if approved by a court
either through enjoining infringement or enforcing the covenant, would
receive a powerful impetus.
Likewise, in Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969),
the Court succinctly stated, “if there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily
follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either section 1
or section 2 of the Sherman Act.” Id.
164. In determining whether a particular plaintiff has standing in antitrust
sense courts consider, on a case by case basis, the following factors: (1) the motive
of the defendant; (2) whether plaintiff’s injury was of a type the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent; (3) the directness of the causal link between the violation
and the injury; (4) the extent to which abstract speculation underlies the
allegations of injury; and (5) the risk of duplicate recoveries or complex
apportionment of damages should the plaintiff be permitted damages. See
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Ca. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 53745 (1983).
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harm to the public interest created by the enforcement of patents
165
tainted by loathsome conduct. The patent misuse doctrine, as an
extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, allows a
court of equity to refuse to lend its support to enforce of a patent
that has been misused. Patent misuse arose as an equitable defense
available to the accused infringer, from the desire to restrain
practices that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew
anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and thus were
166
deemed to be contrary to public policy. This aspect of the patent
misuse defense differs significantly from the justifications upon
which antitrust laws are founded. Antitrust laws seek to level the
167
playing field by freeing the market from “unfair” competition. In
so doing, the antitrust laws work to increase competition, thereby
allowing free market economics to rule corporate behavior. The
patent grant, however, gives to the patent owner the right to
exclude all others from making, using, selling, or importing an
invention. By its very nature, the patent grant provides a framework
through which a patent owner can frustrate a free and competitive
market. Therefore, the question with respect to patent misuse
cannot be whether the free market competition has been curtailed
in a manner that is “unfair,” but rather whether public policy
forbids the patent owner from engaging in conduct that stretches
the granted patent rights beyond what has been intended.
When an action alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither
per se patent misuse, nor specifically excluded from being misuse
165. Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 489 F.Supp. 1129, 1162 (D.C. Ohio
1980); see also Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an
Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 10 (1989).
166. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
see also Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
167. A detailed discussion of the antitrust laws is well beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice it to say, however, that the antitrust laws are intended to prevent the
type of competition that legislators and judges have deemed “unfair,” whether that
be because of a conspiracy to restrain trade (see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001)), because of
market size and power (see 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001)) or for any number of other
actions that have effects that are more anticompetitive than procompetitive. The
antitrust laws, however, do not prohibit the formation of a monopoly through
“fair” means, such as superior business acumen and/or a superior product.
Readers interested in learning more about the antitrust laws in general may find
the following sources helpful: Candice Jones et al., Antitrust Violations, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 431 (2001); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to
Collaborations Among Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2001); Sheila F. Anthony,
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1
(2000); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the
New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2000).
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by 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), a court must determine if that practice is
“reasonably within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject
168
matter within the scope of the patent claims.” If the alleged
action is reasonably within the patent grant, the practice cannot
have the effect of broadening the scope of the patent claims and is
169
not patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the practice has the
effect of extending the patent owners exclusive rights, and it does
so with an anticompetitive effect, the conduct must then be
analyzed in accordance with what is known as the “rule of reason.”
Under the rule of reason, “the finder of fact must decide whether
the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s
170
history, nature, and effect.” The rule of reason, therefore, seeks
to determine “whether the challenged agreement is one that
171
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.” As
the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
172
suppress or even destroy competition.” When rule of reason
analysis is engaged, however, it makes disposition of the case on
summary judgment difficult, which in turn ensures a long,
expensive trial.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR PATENT MISUSE IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA
The questions surrounding business method patents and the
USPTO’s inability to effectively prevent the issuance of highly
suspect patents, leaves one searching for answers. The USPTO,
however, is not to blame for our current state of affairs. To be quite
honest, even the patent applicants are not to blame; they are
merely exercising the rights they have under the current
structure—rules which enable the proliferation of dubious patents.
A duty to search, if enforced, would require patent applicants
168. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
169. Id.
170. State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Ariz. v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343 & n.13 (1982)).
171. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
172. Id.
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to satisfy for themselves that their claimed invention is worthy of
173
the mantle of patent protection. In the absence of a duty to
search, another alternative may be to consider changing our
understanding of patent misuse. While some may think it
preferable to allow some questionable patents to issue, rather than
have every patent owner subject to the duty to search, why should
those seeking redress in the form of a patent infringement suit be
able to fire the first litigation shot without satisfying for themselves
that they possess a property right worthy of protection? Likewise,
why should holders of e-commerce patents be entitled to engage in
legalized licensing extortion?
Critics will undoubtedly say that e-commerce patent owners do
justify for themselves that they are holders of a worthy exclusive
right, and they are merely relying upon the resultant presumption
of validity. This is true, of course, but the reasoning becomes
circular. A patent owner can get a patent without any effort to
demonstrate that they are entitled to such an exclusive right. That
same patent owner is then allowed to claim fair reliance upon the
presumption of validity simply because the patent emerged from
prosecution. The search for truth seems to be missing. Is the
invention worthy of protection? That is the question. Hiding
behind legal niceties and presumptions is not intellectually
satisfying, particular in a world where the peanut butter and jelly
174
sandwich was patented in December 1999, and toast was patented
175
several months later.
As discussed earlier, it is exceedingly difficult to prove that a
patent has been misused. This is particularly true after the
Supreme Court clarified the meaning of sham litigation in National
176
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States. Nevertheless, if we
are going to continue to encourage entrepreneurship and
innovation in the e-commerce realm something must be done. One
of the easiest things to do would be to recognize this as a new type
of patent misuse. Perhaps it is too onerous to force all patent
applicants to conduct a prior art search. As already explained, a
patent neither ensures a market nor creates a monopoly. A patent

173. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
174. See U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 19, 1999) (“Sealed crustless
sandwich”).
175. See U.S. Patent No. 6,080,436 (issued June 27, 2000) (“Bread refreshing
method”).
176. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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dangles only the hope of, and opportunity for achieving, monopoly
profits. Many patents, however, are never going to enjoy market
success. Those patents that do enjoy market success are, therefore,
a small subset of all patents that are issued. For these patents, it
seems particularly appropriate that the patent owner have the
obligation to not use these exclusive rights in such a way to
unnecessarily curtail free market economics.
We tolerate patents because of a perceived societal benefit
from increased innovation. We recognize that free market
economics will be skewed because of the exclusive rights conveyed
by the issued patent. The question, however, is to what extent are
we willing to accept the burdens placed upon us by innovations
that seem hardly worthy of the mantle of patent protection?
To discourage the legalized licensing extortion that threatens
to curtail entrepreneurship in cyberspace we must rethink the
policy that all patents are presumed valid. Experience has
demonstrated that the Patent Office is currently incapable of
ensuring that only worthy inventions are granted patent protection.
Until it can be demonstrated that the Patent Office is capable of
the rigorous examination of e-commerce patents that would ferret
out the worthy from the unworthy applications, some action must
be taken to protect e-business entrepreneurs from a most
unjustified form of business taxation: the private tax imposed by
holders of dubious e-commerce patents.
In order to accomplish the eradication of legalized licensing
extortion, I propose that we consider as patent misuse the attempt
to license an e-commerce patent without first conducting a
thorough search of all relevant prior art. Likewise, another misuse
would include initiating a patent infringement suit without a
similar prior art search. If we do go down this path, however, we
must realize that recognizing a new form of patent misuse will do
no good in deterrence if it can only be raised as an affirmative
defense to a patent infringement action.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the mind of businesspeople, a patent—like all forms of
intellectual property—is nothing more than a barrier to entry that
can, in most cases, provide a head start. Any company that has a
highly developed plan for unearthing, cultivating, protecting and
exploiting intellectual property rights can build a patent portfolio
that can, and will, make competitors think twice about entering
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their marketplace. This truth necessarily means that there are
significant societal costs associated with the granting of any patent,
even under the best of circumstances and with the most onerous
prosecution. We have, however, determined that in order to
encourage innovation we will not only accept but also embrace
some form of limited exclusivity. Therefore, we as a society are
willing to accept the burdens placed upon us so long as we are able
to derive benefit in the form of the patent quid pro quo.
Unfortunately, because a patent enjoys a presumption of
validity once it is issued, even patents that are clearly invalid on
their face act as barriers to entry. Worse yet, these same patents,
once issued, can be used as a significant deterrent to those
individuals and companies interested in conducting commerce via
the Internet. Facing the reality that as much as eighty percent of
business-to-business e-commerce will be conducted via the Internet
in 2003, we do not have the luxury of missing a step by granting
exclusive rights where none should exist. To grant exclusive rights
where they do not belong—in the e-commerce realm, in
particular—would be horribly unjustified and could lead to the
177
potential creation of mega-monopolies that control a piece of
every transaction conducted via the Internet.
There will, of course, be some question as to what level of
search is required in order to insulate a patent owner from an
assertion of misuse. This is hardly a reason to forego such an
alternative. Trademark practitioners routinely acquire searches
from such companies as Thompson & Thompson prior to filing a
trademark application. A trademark search, together with
competent legal advice, can be a defense to damages in a
178
trademark infringement action. A similar standard should be
applied to determine whether a patent search is reasonable. In fact,
this is not a new concept even for patent practitioners, who are
undoubtedly intimately familiar with the fact that would-be
infringers can escape liability for increased damages if they rely
upon the opinions of competent counsel when they are told that
177. While it is true that a patent does not ensure a market and, thereby, does
not ensure a monopoly, a patent certainly dangles the opportunity to achieve
monopoly profits if there is a market and if the patent is pioneering. What we do
know of e-commerce is that there is a market, it is growing at a phenomenal rate,
and many e-commerce patents are issued on the most basic of business models,
which means that the most fundamental businesses are indeed pioneering in a
sense.
178. Nalpac, Ltd. v. Corning Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1986).
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179

their device does not infringe.
As President Clinton explained in January of 2001, “we are still
at the dawn of the Information Age, and much more remains to be
180
done to grasp its potential.” Adhering to patent rules and policy
that work fine on paper, but are flawed in practice, is far too
dangerous a proposition—particularly at the dawn of the
Information Age. Noted scholar and law professor, Lawrence
Lessig, says that e-commerce patents are the single greatest threat
181
to innovation in cyberspace. Time will certainly tell whether that
is true, but early signs are not encouraging for new e-business
entrepreneurs.

179. Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 414 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
180. See Clinton, supra note 1.
181. See David Syrowik & John LeRoy, Finding the Right Balance: Business Method
Patents Generate Controversy and Legal Attention, 80 MICH. B.J. 48 (July 2001).

